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"The market was giving us a reduction in basis points on the coupon, and we felt
there was no probability of violating the covenants [i.e., the performance-pricing
thresholds]."–John Bowen, Morton International Inc., Investment Dealers’ Di-
gest, June 1990.
In 1990, Morton International issued performance-sensitive debt (PSD), which stip-
ulated that the coupon would rise if Morton’s credit rating were to deteriorate. In
return, Morton received better initial pricing than without this performance-pricing
provision. The above quote indicates that at the time of this debt issue the CFO of
Morton International, John Bowen, considered it to be highly improbable that Morton
would be downgraded. Unfortunately, he was wrong. During the life of this debt con-
tract, Morton was downgraded several times, from AA to BBB. Obviously, this may
have been bad luck. But this episode also raises the possibility that management had
biased expectations about Morton’s future performance, and due to these expectations
included a performance pricing provision in their debt contract. This paper therefore
aims to explore in a systematic manner whether managerial biases, such as optimism,
impact the use of performance-pricing provisions.
Manso et al. (2010) hypothesize that performance-sensitive debt (PSD) can be used
to signal a firm’s unobservable information about its credit quality to potential lenders.
Lenders, who cannot distinguish between high and low quality firms, offer borrowers
a menu of contracts, which includes fixed-rate debt and risk-compensating PSD. High
quality firms choose PSD because the initial coupon rate is lower compared to fixed-
rate debt. Low quality firms, on the other hand, will not mimic high quality firms as
low quality firms expect their credit qualities to deteriorate in the future, which would
trigger coupon rate increases and thus higher borrowing costs compared to straight
debt contracts. In the resulting separating equilibrium high quality firms issue PSD,
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while low quality firms issue straight debt.
We argue that optimistic managers, who persistently overestimate their firms’ fu-
ture expected cash flow, may (irrationally) decide to mimic high quality firms and
issue PSD in order to benefit from the relatively low initial coupon rate offered by
lenders on PSD. This possibility gives rise to a number of new testable hypotheses,
which we evaluate in this paper. First, optimistic managers should exhibit a greater
likelihood of using PSD than rational managers as they overestimate their firms’ credit
quality. Second, extending the Manso et al. (2010) framework to continua of credit
qualities and performance-pricing provisions predicts that optimistic managers choose
PSD contracts with more risk-compensation, that is, contracts with a higher sensitiv-
ity of the coupon rate to performance changes, than rational managers on average.
This is because contracts with more risk-compensation offer lower initial coupon rates.
Finally, the post-issue performance of PSD-issuing firms led by optimistic managers
should be worse than the post-issue performance of PSD-issuing firms led by rational
managers, due to the biased expectations of optimistic managers.
We examine these hypotheses using a sample of syndicated and non-syndicated loan
tranches issued between 1992 and 2010, obtained from the LPC Dealscan database.
Asquith et al. (2005) report that the use of performance-pricing provisions has become
widespread since the early 1990s. In Adam and Streitz (2014), 47% of loans reported
in Dealscan contain performance-pricing provisions.
The terms managerial optimism and overconfidence have been used inconsistently
in the literature. We define managerial optimism to mean that the executive persis-
tently overestimates the firm’s future expected cash flow. Of course, future cash flow
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expectations are not observable. We therefore follow the methodology discussed in
Malmendier and Tate (2005a) and classify CEOs as optimistic if they ever hold an
option until maturity, which is at least 40% in-the-money at the year-end prior to
maturity. The rationale behind this measure is that CEOs who typically have a large
fraction of personal wealth tied to their companies and only limited diversification
abilities across alternative investments should rationally exercise an option once it is
in-the-money and exercisable. Only executives who are overly optimistic about their
firm’s future return would decide not to exercise their stock options in these situa-
tions. In addition, we construct the Holder67, Pre-/Post-Optimistic and the optimism
variable proposed by Sen and Tumarkin (2009) to test for robustness of our results.
Our results are consistent with the above empirical predictions. Optimistic CEOs
are 6% more likely to issue PSD than rational CEOs.1 This is economically significant
given an overall mean of about 50%. Optimistic managers also choose PSD with a
higher performance-pricing sensitivity than rational managers. Finally, we find that
the performance of firms with optimistic managers is more likely to deteriorate after the
issuance of PSD compared to firms led by rational managers. This result rules out the
possibility that the managers, which we classify as optimistic, possess positive inside
information about their company’s future performance. If this were true, issuing PSD
could be a rational choice driven by different information sets and not by differences in
opinions. In fact, our result suggests that the issuance of PSD may have been harmful
for firms run by optimistic managers.
1 One potential concern is that CEOs are not involved in the specific design of debt contracts. How-
ever, we argue that the loans in our analysis are fundamental financing decisions that are most
likely to be approved by the top management. The average loan in our sample has a size of 30% of
existing debt. Further, the decision to include performance-pricing provisions is important as they
have a large impact on future coupon payments and the riskiness of a firm (Manso et al. (2010)).
Finally, CEO optimism is likely to further have an indirect effect on the corporate culture and hence
on the willingness to bear risks (Hambrick and Mason (1984)).
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A potential concern with our analysis is that a firm’s choice to hire an optimistic
CEO is endogenous. This decision might be correlated with the same variables that
also affect the decision to issue PSD. We address this issue in two ways. First, we
model the firm’s choice to hire an optimistic CEO using a propensity score matching
approach, that is, we match one firm that is managed by an optimistic CEO to a firm
that is equally likely to be managed by an optimistic CEO but is indeed managed by
a rational CEO. Our results are qualitatively unaffected. The main drawback of this
procedure is that we can only match based on observable characteristics. In a second
step, we therefore control for unobservable (time-invariant) firm characteristics by
testing whether the policy to issue PSD changes after CEO turnover with optimistic
successors. We find that optimistic CEOs increase the issuance of PSD after being
hired while incoming rational CEOs decrease the fraction of PSD issues. The difference
between these two groups is highly significant.
In summary, we show that (i) optimistic managers are more likely to issue PSD
than rational managers, (ii) optimistic managers issue PSD with higher performance-
pricing sensitivities than rational managers, and (iii) firms with optimistic managers
perform worse after issuing PSD than firms with rational managers. These results are
robust to controlling for the endogenous choice of employing an optimistic manager.
We contribute to three strands of the literature. First, our results extend the ex-
isting literature on the impact of managerial biases on corporate financing decisions.
For example, Malmendier et al. (2011) and Graham et al. (2013)) show that manage-
rial optimism affects firms’ capital structure decisions.2 Landier and Thesmar (2009)
2 See also Ben-David et al. (2013), Campbell et al. (2011), Deshmukh et al. (2013), Ferris et al. (2013),
Galasso and Simcoe (2011), Gervais et al. (2011), Goel and Thakor (2008), Hirshleifer et al. (2012),
Lowe and Ziedonis (2006), Malmendier and Zheng (2012) and Otto (2014). Baker et al. (2004)
provide an excellent survey on behavioral corporate finance.
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analyze the debt capital structure of small entrepreneurial firms. In particular, the
authors analyze whether the choice between lines of credit and longer term bank debt
is influenced by entrepreneurial optimism. We add to this literature by showing that
managerial optimism can also affect debt contract design such as the coupon structure
of debt.
Second, to the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to show that manage-
rial biases can have a significant impact on the structure of syndicated loans. The
prior literature has focused solely on neoclassical theories. For example, Bharath et al.
(2011), Ivashina and Kovner (2011), and Prilmeier (2014) show that repeated interac-
tions between borrowers and lenders can reduce information asymmetries, which can
impact loan contract terms. Dass et al. (2012) document that agency problems affect
the syndicate structure. Erel et al. (2012) and Qian and Strahan (2007) analyze how
macroeconomic conditions and laws and institutions shape debt contracts.3 We add
to this literature by showing that behavioral biases can also affect syndicated loans.
Third, we contribute to the literature on performance-pricing provisions in cor-
porate debt contracts. Asquith et al. (2005) argue that PSD is used to reduce debt
renegotiation costs, while Manso et al. (2010) show that PSD can be used as a signal-
ing device for a firm’s credit quality. Other studies document a link between PSD and
earnings management (Beatty and Weber (2003)), manager equity incentives (Tchistyi
et al. (2011)), and relationship lending (Adam and Streitz (2014)). Our paper is the
first to establish a link between the use and design of PSD and managerial optimism.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 presents our hypotheses,
while Section 2 describes the sample. Section 3 contains the empirical analysis of
3 As the literature on syndicated loans is large, this list cannot be exhaustive.
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the impact of managerial optimism on PSD contract terms. In Section 4 we test the
robustness of our results, and Section 5 concludes.
1 Hypothesis Development
In performance-sensitive debt (PSD) the coupon rate is a deterministic function of
the issuer’s performance. The coupon rises if the borrower’s performance deteriorates
and/or falls if the borrower’s performance improves. Manso et al. (2010) show that
PSD can be used as a screening device in a setting with asymmetric information
between borrower and lender. In their model, the growth rate of the cash-flow process
of a firm is private information and depends on the firm’s quality. The lender, who
cannot observe the true quality (cash-flow growth rate) of a potential borrower, offers
a menu of contracts, which includes fixed-rate debt and risk-compensating PSD. In the
resulting separating equilibrium low-growth firms choose to issue fixed-rate debt while
high-growth firms choose to issue risk-compensating PSD. The low-growth firm has
no incentive to deviate from this equilibrium because despite the initially low coupon
rate offered on PSD, PSD subjects the low-growth firm to coupon rate increases in
the future when its true type is revealed. Thus, low-growth firms would face higher
borrowing costs overall if they were to issue PSD rather than regular debt.
In their model, Manso et al. (2010) assume that the manager of a firm correctly
assesses the cash-flow growth rate of his firm and chooses the debt contract according
to this expectation. However, the recent literature questions this assumption (e.g.,
Malmendier and Tate (2005a)). In particular, optimistic managers could persistently
overestimate the firms’ cash-flow growth rate, while rational managers correctly assess
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the firms’ cash-flow growth rate on average. As a result, optimistic managers of low-
growth firms may now decide to pool with rational managers of high-growth firms.4
This implies that optimistic managers are more likely to issue PSD than rational
managers.
Hypothesis 1: Optimistic managers are more likely to issue risk-compensating
PSD than rational managers.
Note that for Hypothesis 1 to hold, we do not require the assumption that the
average quality of the firms managed by optimistic managers is less than the quality
of firms managed by rational managers. We only require that there are firms for which
it is optimal to issue PSD and firms for which it is optimal to issue fixed-rate debt in
both groups. Then some low-growth firms that are managed by optimistic managers
will issue PSD, as the optimistic manager overestimates the firms’ cash-flow growth
rate. Firms with a comparable quality that are managed by rational managers will
choose fixed-rate debt instead.
Manso et al. (2010) assume for simplicity that there are only two types of firms: low-
growth firms and high-growth firms. This assumption can be relaxed without affecting
the separating equilibrium. Under the assumption that a continuous distribution of
cash-flow growth rates exists, PSD screens different types through different levels of
performance-pricing sensitivities. Fixed-rate debt can simply be considered as a PSD
contract with a pricing grid that is flat.
Consider, for example, a setting with three different types of firms: low-growth,
medium-growth, and high-growth. In this situation a separating equilibrium can still
4 The pooling of optimistic managers with rational managers of high-growth firms preserves the
equilibrium as long as the coupon rate increases of PSD adequately compensate the lender for the
increase in credit risk due to the presence of some low-growth borrowers.
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be achieved: Low-growth firms choose PSD contracts with no (or low) rate-increase po-
tential, medium growth firms choose PSD contracts with some rate-increase potential,
and high-growth firms choose PSD contracts with the highest rate-increase potential.
This implies that there must be cross-sectional variation within PSD contracts if one
allows for a range of different firm types. If optimistic managers generally overestimate
the cash-flow growth rate of their firms, this implies that — conditional on choosing
PSD — optimistic managers will choose PSD with a higher performance-pricing sen-
sitivity than rational managers within the same group.
Hypothesis 2: Optimistic managers choose PSD with a higher performance-
pricing sensitivity than rational managers.
Our theory builds on the fact that optimistic managers mimic firms with higher
quality by using PSD. If this is the case, then the post-issue firm performance of
optimistic managers is expected to be worse than the post-issue firm performance
of rational managers using PSD. Hypothesis 1 stipulates that some low-growth firms
with optimistic managers choose PSD contracts and pool with high-growth firms that
have rational managers. Therefore, the set of firms with rational managers that have
issued PSD contracts solely consists of high-growth firms, while the set of firms with
optimistic managers that have issued PSD contracts consists of both high-growth and
low growth firms. This gives rise to our third hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3: The performance following a PSD issue is worse for firms managed
by optimistic managers than for firms managed by rational managers.
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2 Data Description
2.1 Managerial Optimism
We start by classifying CEOs as either rational or optimistic following Malmendier and
Tate (2005a), that is, we measure optimism based on executive option holdings. We use
ExecuComp to obtain information on executive stock option grants, exercised options,
and option holdings. We restrict our sample to the 1992 to 2010 period and exclude
financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999). As ExecuComp contains option exercises only in
an aggregated form and not on the grant level, we follow Hall and Liebman (1998) and
apply a FIFO-algorithm to construct the option portfolios in a given year.5 Thereby
executives are classified as optimistic if they ever hold an option until maturity, which
is at least 40% in-the-money at the year-end prior to maturity.6 Thus, optimism is
considered as an inherent, time-invariant personal characteristic of an executive.
The intuition for relying on the executives’ option exercise behavior as a means of
classification into rational or optimistic managers is the following: Executives face a
trade-off between exercising their options or keeping the options for later exercise. By
keeping the options, they maintain the right to purchase company stock at potentially
more favorable conditions in the future. The downside of this strategy is that it involves
substantial costs for the executive in terms of exposure to idiosyncratic risk. Executive
stock options typically have a maturity of ten years and become vested after two to
four years. Furthermore, diversifying this exposure is problematic as executives are
5 See Appendix 1 in Hall and Liebman (1998) for further details.
6 The threshold is derived according to Hall and Murphy (2002) by using a constant risk aversion
parameter of 3 and 67% of wealth in company stock. The original Malmendier and Tate (2005b)
classification does not require a minimum threshold for in-the-moneyness and solely requires option
holding until maturity.
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legally prohibited from short-selling their company’s stock. Given the large fraction
of personal wealth tied to their company, diversification abilities across alternative
investments are also limited. Lastly, besides the financial exposure, also a substantial
fraction of the executive’s human capital is tied to the company (Malmendier and Tate
(2008)). Consequently executives can be considered as under-diversified investors, who
have a large exposure to their company’s risk. Thus, rational executives should divest
as soon as the option is sufficiently in-the-money because the cost of delayed exercise
typically exceeds its option value. In contrast, executives who are optimistic and
therefore overestimate the firm’s future return may fail to exercise their stock options
in these situations.
2.2 Loan Sample
We obtain loan contract information from LPC Dealscan for all companies for which the
CEO of the borrowing firm can be classified as optimistic or rational.7 We additionally
merge our loan deal panel to COMPUSTAT to obtain financial information on the
borrowers.8 We refer to the Appendix for a detailed description of the control variables
used.
Dealscan reports information on performance pricing provisions included in loan
contracts. In particular, Dealscan reports the pricing grid, that is, a step func-
tion schedule linking the interest payments to a measure of financial performance.9
7 As common in the literature the loan panel is created on the facility (tranche) level (e.g., Berg et al.
(2013), and Bharath et al. (2007)).
8 We use the link provided by Michael Roberts to merge Dealscan with COMPUSTAT (see Chava
and Roberts (2008) for details). We obtain borrower information from the last available fiscal year
before the loan issue.
9 The most common financial measure used in PSD contracts reported in Dealscan is the debt-to-
EBITDA ratio (∼ 50% of all PSD loans issued by US borrowers) followed by the senior debt rating
(∼ 25%). Other less commonly used measures are the interest coverage ratio, the fixed charge ratio
or leverage. A minority of PSD deals uses multiple performance criteria.
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We define a dummy variable, PSD, which equals one if a loan contract includes a
performance-pricing provision and zero otherwise. We further distinguish between
interest-increasing, interest-decreasing, and mixes PSD. In interest-increasing contracts
the coupon rate on the loan mostly increases if the borrower’s creditworthiness declines.
Interest-decreasing and mixed PSD are defined accordingly. In particular, we define
the following ratio:
Rate De-/Increase = SInitial − SMin
SMax − SMin . (1)
SInitial is the interest rate paid at contract inception and SMax (SMin) is the highest
(lowest) interest rate defined in the pricing grid. Rate De-/Increase is zero (one) if
the pricing grid allows for interest increases (decreases) only. Contracts with a ratio
between zero and one allow for both interest rate increases and interest rate decreases.
We define indicator variables for terciles of this ratio to categorize PSD contracts into
(mainly) rate-increasing, mixed, and (mainly) rate-decreasing.10 Disentangling rate-
increasing and rate-decreasing PSD is important as our main hypotheses are derived
for rate-increasing PSD.11
Figure 1 shows the pricing grid of a loan issued by IBM in March 2004 as an
example. In this contract, the interest rate changes with IBM’s senior debt rating.
Since IBM’s senior debt rating at the time of the issue was A+, this loan is an example
10 For robustness we replicated all our specifications defining only contracts as rate-increasing (rate-
decreasing) if Rate De-/Increase is exactly equal to zero (one). The remaining PSD contracts, that
is, contracts with Rate De-/Increase between zero an one, are defined as mixed. All our results
remain qualitatively unchanged if we use this alternative definition.
11 The use of rate-decreasing PSD can be motivated by other reasons. For example, Asquith et al.
(2005) argue that rate-decreasing PSD is a prepayment option for the borrower, which does not
require renegotiation. The interest rate is automatically reduced if there are unanticipated improve-
ments in the borrower’s performance, thereby lowering renegotiation costs.
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of a mixed PSD contract.
[Figure 1 here]
2.3 Descriptive Statistics
We provide descriptive statistics for borrower and loan characteristics in Table 1. We
divide the sample into firms managed by optimistic and rational managers. Panel A
reports descriptives for borrower characteristics. Unsurprisingly, the companies in our
sample are large. By relying on information from the ExecuComp database, which
covers all companies listed in the S&P 1,500, we effectively restrict our sample to
large public US companies. Borrowers with CEOs that are classified as optimistic
are on average smaller compared to borrowers with CEOs that are classified as ratio-
nal. The mean/median size is $7,452/$2,225 million USD for rational borrowers and
$6,502/$2,136 million USD for optimistic borrowers. The other borrower characteris-
tics are similar. Panel B.1 provides descriptive statistics for general loan characteristics.
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, we find that the fraction of PSD contracts is 4% higher
in the sample of loans issued by optimistic CEOs when compared with loans issued
by rational CEOs (57% vs. 53%). The median loan amount is $250 for both groups
and also the median maturity is similar (about 5 years). Panel B.2 provides descrip-
tive statistics for the subset of performance-sensitive loans. Within PSD contracts
firms managed by optimistic managers in particular issue more rate-increasing PSD if
compared to firms managed by rational managers.
[Table 1 here]
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3 Managerial Optimism & Performance-Sensitive Debt
3.1 Performance-Sensitive vs. Straight Debt
In this section, we analyze the relationship between managerial optimism and the use
of PSD. We begin by estimating the following Logit regression specification:
PSDit = α+ β ∗Optimisticit + γ ∗X ′it−1 + δ ∗ Y ′it + it. (2)
The dependent variable, PSD, is a dummy variable, which equals one if the loan
contract includes a performance-pricing provision and zero otherwise. Optimistic in-
dicates whether the borrowing firm is managed by an optimistic CEO. X is a set of
borrower characteristics and Y a set of loan characteristics.12 We also include industry,
time, and rating fixed effects.
[Table 2 here]
The results reported in Table 2 indicate that managerial traits may significantly
impact the firms’ decision to issue PSD. Loans issued by optimistic CEOs are about
6% more likely to contain performance-pricing provisions than loans issued by rational
CEOs. Smaller firms are also more likely to issue PSD than larger firms. Further-
more, larger loans and loans that have a longer maturity are more likely to contain
performance-pricing provisions. These findings are consistent with the existing lit-
erature, which argues that PSD can be used to overcome asymmetric information
12 As noted in the data section, we obtain borrower information from the last available fiscal year
before the loan issue (t− 1).
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problems (see Asquith et al. (2005), Manso et al. (2010)), which are more significant
in larger loans and loans of longer maturities.
Next, we examine whether the higher likelihood of using PSD by optimistic man-
agers is driven by rate-increasing or rate-decreasing PSD. To do so, we estimate a
multinomial logit model, in which the dependent variable can take on four values:
0 for straight debt, 1 for (mainly) rate-increasing PSD, 2 for mixed PSD, and 3 for
(mainly) rate-decreasing PSD.
[Table 3 here]
Table 3 shows that the effect reported in Table 2 is solely driven by a preference
of optimistic managers for rate-increasing PSD contracts. Optimistic managers are
about 5% more likely to use rate-increasing PSD, while we find no significant correla-
tion between optimism and mixed or rate-decreasing PSD. Overall, these findings are
consistent with Hypothesis 1.
3.2 PSD Pricing-Grid Structure
Hypothesis 2 stipulates that optimistic managers choose PSD with higher performance-
pricing sensitivities than rational managers. To test this hypothesis we analyze the
structure of the PSD pricing grids in more detail. Figure 2, shows the average pricing
grid of firms with optimistic and rational CEOs. The graph indicates that the difference
between the maximum and the minimum coupon rate is on average higher if the
CEO is optimistic than if the CEO is rational.13 Of course, the graphical evidence
13 The median credit rating at the time of the loan issue is BBB+ for both optimistic and rational
CEOs, suggesting that the differences in the pricing grids are not driven by differences in the riskiness
of the issuing firms.
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serves as a first indication only, as borrowers with optimistic CEOs and borrowers with
rational CEOs are not unconditionally comparable (borrower and loan characteristics
may differ).
[Figure 2 here]
To test Hypothesis 2 in a more refined way, we follow Tchistyi et al. (2011) and
calculate the slope of the pricing grid of a PSD contract. The slope relates coupon
rate changes resulting from changes in the issuer’s credit rating to differences in market
interest rates over the same rating changes.14 A slope of one implies that the pricing
grid reflects the market interest rate structure at origination of the loan issue. A slope
measure greater than one indicates that the coupon rate is more sensitive to rating
changes than market interest rates at origination of the loan issue. To differentiate
between up- and downgrade effects we further calculate slope measures separately
for the rate-increasing and the rate-decreasing regions of the pricing grid. Similar to
Tchistyi et al. (2011), we calculate the slope "locally" (pricing steps directly adjacent
to the initial interest rate) and as the average slope over the pricing grid. The local
slope is defined as follows:
LocalSlope = 0.5 ∗
(
Si+1 − Si
Bondi+1 −Bondi +
Si − Si−1
Bondi −Bondi−1
)
, (3)
where Si is the coupon rate that the borrower pays at the initial rating i. Si+1 (Si−1)
is the coupon rate, which the borrower pays at the next higher rating (lower) rating
notch. Bondi denotes a bond market index at rating i. We use the Bloomberg Bond
14 Since market interest rates are available only for particular rating classes, we can calculate slope
measures for rating-based PSD only.
16
Market Index for the construction. The average slope is calculated similarly by using
all interest rate changes defined in the pricing grid. Figure 3 illustrates this procedure.
[Figure 3 here]
The OLS regression results relating the slope of rating-based PSD contracts to
managerial optimism are reported in Table 5. We follow Tchistyi et al. (2011) and
define the slope of fixed rate debt to be zero.15 We address skewness in the slope
measure by using ln(Slope) in the regressions.
[Table 5 here]
As shown in Table 5, we find that loans issued by optimistic CEOs have significantly
larger local slopes over regions of rating downgrades. This means that optimistic
CEOs choose pricing provisions that allow for larger interest rate increases (relative
to the market yield) than PSD contracts chosen by rational CEOs. Results for the
average slope measures are similar to those for the local slope measures. To summarize,
consistent with Hypothesis 2, optimistic CEOs choose pricing grids with steeper slopes
compared with the slopes of the pricing grids chosen by rational CEOs.
3.3 Post-Issue Performance
In this subsection, we test whether firms with optimistic managers perform worse after
issuing rate-increasing PSD relative to firms with rational managers (Hypothesis 3 ).
15 We obtain qualitatively the same results if we use a Tobit specification with zero as the lower bound.
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In particular, we estimate the following model:
∆Performanceit+k = α+ β1 ∗Optimisticit + γ ∗X ′it−1 + δ ∗ Y ′it + it. (4)
∆Performanceit+k is the change in financial performance of the borrower k years
after the issue (k = 1, 2).16 We use two different measures of firm performance: the
debt-to-EBITDA ratio and the firm’s credit rating. These two measures are the two
most commonly used performance measures in PSD contracts.17 The regression in-
cludes rate-increasing PSD contracts only.18 We focus on rate-increasing PSD because
as shown in Table 3, managerial optimism is related to the use of rate-increasing PSD
only. Table 5 presents the regression results.
[Table 5 here]
The results in Columns 1 and 2 show that the debt-to-EBITDA ratio of firms
with optimistic CEOs increases in the years following a PSD issue relative to firms
with rational CEOs. This effect is economically large. A change of 0.4 (Column 1)
represents about one half of the standard deviation of the debt-to-EBITDA ratio. This
suggests that the performance (here: leverage) of these firms deteriorates significantly
after the loan issue, leading to higher interest payments. In Columns 3 and 4, the
dependent variable is a dummy variable, which equals one if the issuer is downgraded
following the loan issue and zero otherwise. The results show that the credit rating of
16 To ensure that our performance measure is not affected by the loan issue, we calculate performance
changes based on financial statements, which are issued after the respective loan issue.
17 More than 75% of all PSD contracts are written on either the issuer’s credit rating or the issuer’s
debt-to-EBITDA ratio.
18 Using both PSD and straight debt contracts and interacting Optimistic with a PSD indicator
variable yields qualitatively similar results.
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firms with optimistic CEOs is about 5% more likely to be downgraded one year after a
PSD issue compared to the credit rating of firms managed by rational CEOs. Again,
this result is consistent with the hypothesis that following PSD issues, the performance
of firms with optimistic CEOs is worse than the performance of firms with rational
CEOs.
Note that the results in Table 5 also rule out a possible alternative explanation of
our results. Delaying the exercise of an in-the-money option can be a rational strategy
if the manager possesses positive inside information. Therefore, being optimistic may
capture positive inside information of a manager and not only irrational over-optimism.
In this case, "optimistic" managers may issue PSD simply because they possess positive
inside information about the firm’s future performance. However, if this were the case,
we would expect firm performance following a PSD issue to be better than that of
rational managers on average. Our findings show that the opposite is the case.
3.4 Endogeneity
A potential concern with our analysis is that managerial optimism may be an endoge-
nous choice by the firm’s owners when selecting a CEO. The same factors that drive the
choice of the CEO could in principle also determine the use of PSD. In order to address
this problem we use a propensity score matching approach and estimate the probability
that a firm is managed by an optimistic CEO. For example, Hirshleifer et al. (2012)
argue that a reason for hiring optimistic CEOs might be that optimistic managers are
more likely to invest in more innovative and riskier projects and can thereby benefit
shareholders. We explicitly control for firm age in the first stage regression because
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innovations are more important in younger firms.19 Furthermore, we use several firm
characteristics, such as total assets, leverage, market-to-book, asset tangibility, inter-
est coverage, profitability, current ratio, and industry-, year- and credit rating (notch
level) fixed effects as additional explanatory variables. In untabulated results we find
that firms with lower leverage ratios, higher market-to-book ratios, lower interest cov-
erage ratios, and younger firms are more likely to be managed by optimistic CEOs. In
the next step we match firms based on the probability to be managed by an optimistic
CEO, that is, we match one firm that is managed by an optimistic CEO to a firm that
is predicted to be managed by an optimistic CEO but is indeed managed by a rational
CEO.
[Table 6 here]
In Table 6 we report results of a logit regression specification as in Table 2 for
the matched sample. We find that optimistic CEOs are 9-10% more likely to issue
performance-sensitive debt contracts compared to rational CEOs. Thus, our results
are even stronger after accounting for a possibly endogenous selection of optimistic
CEOs.
A drawback of the propensity score matching technique is that the choice to hire
an optimistic CEO can only be modeled based on observable firm characteristics. To
control for unobservable time-invariant firm characteristics that might be correlated
with the use of PSD and managerial optimism, we examine PSD issuance after CEO
turnover.
19 We compute firm age based on the data provided by Laura Field and Jay Ritter available
on http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/foundingdates.htm. The data is described in detail in
Loughran and Ritter (2004). Firm founding dates are only available for roughly 50% of our sample,
which leads to a sample reduction in Table 6.
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In particular, we compare the use of PSD of incoming optimistic CEOs with the
use of PSD of incoming rational CEOs three years before and three years after the
turnover event.20 We are forced to disregard the type of the outgoing CEOs due to
data limitations. Conditioning our analysis on the type of outgoing CEO would render
the sample size to be too small for statistical inference. Not conditioning on the type
of the outgoing CEO, however, is conservative as it biases our tests against finding a
statistically significant relationship.
We estimate two separate linear probability models with a dummy variable equal
to one if the company issues a loan with a performance-pricing provision and zero
otherwise as dependent variable. The first column includes only observations where the
incoming CEO is optimistic, the second column only observations where the incoming
CEO is rational. Both regressions include the same control variables as in Table 2.
To see whether optimistic CEOs pursue a different policy with respect to the use of
PSD we estimate a difference-in-differences model. The first difference is calculated as
the difference between the fraction of loans with a performance-pricing feature before
and after the CEO turnover, represented by the coefficient Post Turnover. The second
difference is the difference in the coefficient Post Turnover between optimistic and
rational CEOs.
[Table 7 here]
Our results are presented in Table 7. We find that optimistic CEOs significantly
increase the fraction of loans with a performance-pricing provision while rational CEOs
seem to decrease the fraction of PSD (although not significantly). The difference
20 The results are qualitatively similar if we vary the event window and use, for example, five years
before and after the turnover.
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between both coefficients is significantly different from zero suggesting that optimistic
CEOs are more likely to issue PSD relative to rational CEOs even after controlling for
unobservable, time-invariant firm effects.
4 Robustness
4.1 Other Optimism Measures
In this section, we analyze whether our results are robust to alternative methods to
identify optimistic managers. In particular, we consider different moneyness thresholds
for the original optimism classification, distinguish between Pre- and Post-Optimism,
and consider alternative methods to identify optimism.
[Table 8 here]
Table 8 replicates Table 2 but uses alternative optimism measures. In Columns 1
and 2 we use more conservative moneyness thresholds than in our original optimism
classification. In particular, we identify executives as optimistic if they ever hold an op-
tion until one year prior to expiration, which is at least 70% in-the-money (Column 1)
or at least 100% in-the-money (Column 2). The original classification uses a moneyness
threshold of 40%. The results in Table 8 confirm our previous findings. Firms man-
aged by optimistic CEOs are significantly more likely to include a performance-pricing
provision in their loan contracts than firms managed by rational CEOs. Thus, our
results are not sensitive to the choice of the moneyness parameter, which is consistent
with the robustness checks in Malmendier and Tate (2008).
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Next, we follow Malmendier and Tate (2008) and distinguish between the time
before and after an optimistic manager has ever shown evidence of being optimistic.
The motivation for this separation is to justify the treatment of optimism as a time-
invariant, personal characteristic. Pre-Optimism refers to the time period before the
respective executive first holds an option that is at least 40% in-the-money until the
final maturity year, and Post-Optimism refers to the time period thereafter. Table
8 shows that optimistic CEOs are significantly more likely to use PSD than rational
CEOs, both before and after they are classified by our algorithm. This finding supports
the notion that optimism is a time-invariant, personal characteristic.
In Column 4 we employ a different identification method of optimism, suggested
by Malmendier and Tate (2005b). According to this method, CEOs are classified as
optimistic if they hold stock options that are at least 67% in the money five years after
the respective option grants. A CEO needs to show this behavior at least twice during
his tenure to be classified as optimistic. Malmendier and Tate (2005b) refer to this
measure as Holder 67.21 Using the Holder 67 measure instead of the original optimism
variable, our results are even stronger than before.
In Column 5, we use a new identification method of optimism first proposed by
Sen and Tumarkin (2009). Instead of analyzing executives’ option exercise behavior,
this method examines the executives’ stock holdings. An executive is classified as
optimistic if his total stock holdings relative to his salary exceed the median stock
holdings to salary ratio. The intuition for this classification is similar to the Optimistic
classification. Executives are generally poorly diversified and have a large idiosyncratic
risk exposure to their firms. Consequently, they should hold as little of their companies’
21 We are grateful to Rik Sen for providing us with this measure.
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stock as possible. If executives voluntarily hold more stock, they are likely to be overly
optimistic with respect to the future performance of their firms. According to Core and
Larcker (2002), many firms have a minimum stock holding requirement for their top
executives in place, which often is stated in terms of multiples of the executives’ salary.
Like Sen and Tumarkin (2009) we use the median of this stock holdings-to-salary
multiple as our threshold to distinguish between rational and optimistic executives.
Again, the results in Table 8 confirm our previous findings that firms with optimistic
CEOs are more likely to use performance-pricing provisions than firms managed by
rational CEOs. In summary, our findings are robust to several alternative optimism
specifications.
4.2 CEO Characteristics
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) show that managerial style, which is likely to be affected
by manager characteristics such as age, gender or educational background, significantly
affects corporate financial policy. For example, Beber and Fabbri (2012) find that CEO
age and education is correlated with speculation in the FX market. Huang and Kisgen
(2013) find that male executives make riskier financial and investment decisions than
female executives. Kaplan et al. (2012) find that general CEO ability and execution
skills matter in buyout and venture capital transactions. To address the concern that
our optimism measure may be correlated with CEO characteristics that also affect
risk-taking and therefore the decision to issue PSD, we explicitly control for CEO age,
tenure, gender, and education in this section.
In addition to personal managerial characteristics, executive compensation plans
are likely to also affect risk-taking behavior. In the context of PSD, Tchistyi et al.
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(2011) document that managers whose compensation is more sensitive to stock return
volatility choose riskier pricing grids. To rule out the possibility that our results are
driven by a correlation between the optimism measures and the delta/vega of the
CEOs stock option portfolio, we explicitly control our analysis for these sensitivities.
We follow Core and Guay (2002) in calculating delta and vega. The results are reported
in Table 9.
[Table 9 here]
Besides optimism, the only variable that is significantly correlated with the decision
to issue PSD is age, that is, the age of the CEO at the time of the debt issue (in years).
Older CEOs are less likely to issue loans that contain performance-pricing provisions
than younger CEOs. The other personal characteristics, as well as the delta and the
vega of the CEO’s stock and option portfolio are not significantly related to the decision
to issue PSD. As noted above, controlling for delta and vega mitigates concerns that
our optimism measure is positively correlated with a larger general risk preference by
those executives.
5 Conclusion
This paper explores the impact of managerial optimism on debt contract design. In
particular, we investigate whether optimistic CEOs, that is, managers who persis-
tently overestimate their firms’ future expected cash flow, are more likely to issue
performance-sensitive debt (PSD) than rational managers. This possibility arises when
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optimistic managers decide to pool with rational managers who signal their credit wor-
thiness using PSD.
We find that optimistic managers are indeed more likely to issue PSD than ratio-
nal managers. We further find that within the subset of PSD issuing firms, optimistic
managers choose contracts with higher performance-pricing sensitivities, i.e., pricing
grids with more coupon rate increase potential in response to performance deteriora-
tion. Finally, we find that firms managed by optimistic managers perform worse after
a PSD issue compared to firms managed by rational managers. This result confirms
that our results are not simply driven by optimistic managers possessing some informa-
tion advantage relative to rational managers. Our results are robust to the endogenous
choice of the CEO as well as several robustness checks. Overall, our results suggest that
managerial optimism can have a significant impact on a firm’s debt contract design.
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Figure 1: PSD Pricing Grid Example
This figure shows the spread over LIBOR IBM paid on a syndicated loan contract
negotiated in March 2004. IBM’s senior credit rating at the time of the loan issues
was A+, the initial interest rate LIBOR + 12bp. Source: Dealscan.
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Figure 2: PSD Pricing Grids - Optimistic vs. Rational CEOs
This figure shows the average pricing grids for firms with optimistic CEOs (straight
line) and rational CEOs (dashed line). The relative spread at each rating notch is
calculated as the actual spread at that rating notch divided by the spread paid if the
issuers credit rating is AAA.
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Figure 3: Slope of the PSD Pricing Grid
This figure shows a hypothetical rating-based performance pricing grid. The rating at
the time of loan origination is assumed to be A-. The local Slope measures the pricing
grid slope around the initial rating, and is defined as follows:
Local Slope = 0.5 ∗
(
SA− − SA
BondA− −BondA +
SA − SA+
BondA −BondA+
)
Si is the spread at rating notch i, Bondi is the level of the bond market index for rating
notch i. Local Slope ↑ and Local Slope ↓ measure the local slopes for rating increases
and rating decreases respectively. The average slope measures the overall slope of the
pricing grid, and is defined as follows:
Average Slope = 13 ∗
(
SA − SA+
BondA −BondA+ +
SA− − SA
BondA− −BondA
+ SBBB+ − SA−
BondBBB+ −BondA−
)
We also define the average slopes for rating increases and rating decreases according
to the local slope definitions. The slope of straight debt is equal to zero.
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Table 2: Performance-Sensitive vs. Straight Debt
This table reports the marginal effects of logit regressions. The dependent variable equals one if a
loan includes a performance pricing provision and zero otherwise. The main variable of interest is
Optimistic, which is an indicator variable that equals one if the CEO of the borrower is classified
as optimistic and zero otherwise. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. Marginal
effects for each covariate are calculated as the difference in predicted probabilities for a particular
outcome computed at their mean values holding all other covariates constant. For factor levels it is
computed as a discrete change from the base level. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and
clustered at the firm level to account for non-independent observations within firms. *, **, *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PSD (0/1) PSD (0/1) PSD (0/1) PSD (0/1)
Panel A: Optimism Classification
Optimistic (0/1) 0.064∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
Panel B: Borrower Characteristics
ln(Total Assets) −0.032∗∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.013)
Leverage −0.089 −0.101
(0.070) (0.072)
Market-to-Book −0.003 −0.004
(0.013) (0.013)
Tangibility −0.096 −0.044
(0.074) (0.078)
Interest Coverage 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Profitability 0.127 0.002
(0.095) (0.093)
Current Ratio −0.018 −0.011
(0.012) (0.013)
Panel C: Loan Characteristics
ln(Facility Amount) 0.141∗∗∗
(0.011)
ln(Maturity) 0.123∗∗∗
(0.013)
Multiple Tranches (0/1) 0.078∗∗∗
(0.018)
Term Loan (0/1) −0.238∗∗∗
(0.021)
Secured (0/1) 0.160∗∗∗
(0.023)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes
Credit Rating Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,749 6,703 6,703 6,703
Pseudo R2 0.060 0.074 0.078 0.154
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Table 3: Interest Increasing vs. Interest Decreasing PSD
This table reports the marginal effects of a multinominal logit regression. The dependent variable
equals one for PSD contracts that contain mainly spread increase features (Column 1), two for PSD
contracts that contain both spread increase and spread decrease features (Column 2), three for PSD
contracts that contain mainly spread decrease features (Column 3) and zero for non-PSD contracts
(base group). The independent variables are the same as the ones used in Table 2 and are defined
in the Appendix. Marginal effects for each covariate are computed as the difference in predicted
probabilities for a particular outcome computed at their mean values holding all other covariates
constant. For factor levels it is computed as a discrete change from the base level. Standard errors are
heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the firm level to account for non-independent observations
within firms. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
PSD (Increasing) PSD (Mixed) PSD (Decreasing)
Optimistic (0/1) 0.044∗∗∗ 0.007 0.007
(0.017) (0.012) (0.005)
Borrower Characteristics Yes
Loan Characteristics Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes
Credit Rating Fixed Effects Yes
Observations 6,718
Pseudo R2 0.182
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Table 4: Managerial Optimism and the Slope of PSD Contracts
This table reports OLS regressions of the slopes of the performance pricing grids on CEO, borrower
and loan characteristics. The dependent variables are the slope measures defined in Figure 3. The
independent variables are the same as in Table 2 and are defined in the Appendix. The sample includes
straight debt contracts and rating-based PSD contracts. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust
and clustered at the firm level to account for non-independent observations within firms. *, **, ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: Local Slopes
(1) (2) (3)
Local Slope Local Slope ↑ Local Slope ↓
Optimistic (0/1) 0.014∗∗ 0.006 0.018∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Borrower Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Loan Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Credit Rating Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,502 4,365 4,428
Adj. R2 0.228 0.206 0.210
Panel B: Average Slopes
(4) (5) (6)
Average Slope Average Slope ↑ Average Slope ↓
Optimistic (0/1) 0.012∗ 0.009 0.014∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Borrower Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Loan Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Credit Rating Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,502 4,366 4,430
Adj. R2 0.229 0.230 0.208
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Table 6: Propensity Score Matching - PSD vs. Straight Debt
This table reports the marginal effects for the second stage of a propensity score matching model. The
dependent variable equals one if a loan includes a performance-pricing provision and zero otherwise.
The independent variables are the same as in Table 2 and are defined in the Appendix. The propensity
scores are estimated in the first stage by a logit regression using a dummy as the dependent variable
that equals one if the firm is managed by an optimistic CEO and zero otherwise. Marginal effects
for each covariate are computed as the difference in predicted probabilities for a particular outcome
computed at their mean values holding all other covariates constant. For factor levels it is computed
as a discrete change from the base level. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at
the firm level to account for non-independent observations within firms. *, **, *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
(1) (2)
PSD (0/1) PSD (0/1)
Optimistic (0/1) 0.095∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.035)
Borrower Characteristics Yes Yes
Loan Characteristics No Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Credit Rating Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 1,659 1,659
Pseudo R2 0.119 0.204
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Table 7: CEO Turnover - PSD vs. Straight Debt
This table reports estimation results of fixed effects linear probability models. The dependent variable
equals one if a loan includes a performance pricing provision and zero otherwise. The independent
variables are the same as in Table 2 and are defined in the Appendix. The sample only includes loans
issued during the three years before and after a CEO turnover and loans of firms where the new CEO
can be classified as either optimistic or rational. In total, there are 161 CEO turnover events. Post
Turnover is an indicator variable which equals one if the loan was issued in the three years following a
CEO turnover. In model (1), the sample is restricted to events where the incoming CEO was classified
as optimistic. In model (2), the sample is restricted to events where the incoming CEO was classified
as rational. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
New CEO Optimistic New CEO Rational
(1) (2)
PSD (0/1) PSD (0/1)
Post Turnover (0/1) 0.295∗∗ −0.058
(0.148) (0.082)
Borrower Characteristics Yes Yes
Loan Characteristics Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Credit Rating Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 236 620
Adj. R2 0.530 0.449
Test if coefficients are equal in both models:
Post Turnover (Optimistic) = Post Turnover (Rational)
χ2(1) = 5.15
Prob > χ2 = 0.0233**
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Table 8: Alternative Optimism Classifications
This table reports the marginal effects of logit regressions. The dependent variable equals one if a
loan includes a performance pricing provision and zero otherwise. Optimism 70 and Optimism 100 are
indicator variables that equal one if the CEO of the borrower is classified as optimistic, i.e., if the CEO
ever held an option until the final maturity year, which is at least 70 or 100% in the money and zero
otherwise. Holder67 is an indicator variable that is equal to one if CEOs did not exercise options that
were at least 67% in the money in their fifth year at least twice during their tenure. Pre-Optimistic
and Post-Optimistic indicate the time period before an executive ever held an option until the final
maturity year, which is at least 40% in the money and the time period after this activity, respectively.
Voluntary Holder is an indicator variable that equals one if CEOs voluntarily holds more stocks of
their company than required by company constitutions. The other independent variables are the same
as the ones used in Table 2 and are defined in the Appendix. Marginal effects for each covariate are
constructed as the difference in predicted probabilities for a particular outcome computed at their
mean values holding all other covariates constant. For factor levels it is computed as a discrete change
from the base level. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the firm level to
account for non-independent observations within firms. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PSD (0/1) PSD (0/1) PSD (0/1) PSD (0/1) PSD (0/1)
Optimistic (70) (0/1) 0.051∗∗
(0.025)
Optimistic (100) (0/1) 0.056∗∗
(0.026)
Pre-Optimistic (0/1) 0.063∗∗
(0.029)
Post-Optimistic (0/1) 0.051∗
(0.029)
Holder 67 (0/1) 0.082∗∗∗
(0.028)
Voluntary Holder (0/1) 0.064∗∗∗
(0.024)
Borrower Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Credit Rating Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,703 6,703 6,703 3,379 6,417
Pseudo R2 0.153 0.153 0.154 0.167 0.147
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Table 9: CEO Characteristics
This table reports the marginal effects of logit regressions. The dependent variable equals one if a loan
includes a performance pricing provision and zero otherwise. Female is a dummy variable that is equal
to one if the CEO is female. Ph.D. is a dummy variable if the CEO holds a Ph.D. degree. Tenure is
the time in days since the executive became CEO. Delta measures the sensitivity of the CEO’s overall
option and stock portfolio to price movements of the company’s stock. Vega measures the sensitivity
of the CEO’s overall option and stock portfolio to volatility changes of the company’s stock. The
other independent variables are the same as the ones used in Table 2 and are defined in the Appendix.
Marginal effects for each covariate are constructed as the difference in predicted probabilities for a
particular outcome computed at their mean values holding all other covariates constant. For factor
levels it is computed as a discrete change from the base level. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity
robust and clustered at the firm level to account for non-independent observations within firms. *, **,
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
PSD (0/1) PSD (0/1) PSD (0/1)
Optimistic (0/1) 0.058∗∗ 0.054∗∗ 0.052∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
Female (0/1) −0.021 −0.036
(0.084) (0.090)
Ph.D. (0/1) 0.017 0.000
(0.059) (0.061)
Age −0.003∗∗ −0.003∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Tenure 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Delta −0.162 −0.148
(0.285) (0.289)
Vega −0.002 −0.001
(0.005) (0.005)
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Loan Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Credit Rating Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,567 6,139 6,008
Pseudo R2 0.154 0.149 0.150
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Appendix
Variable Name Definition
Managerial Characteristics:
Optimistic (0/1) A dummy variable which equals one if a manager holds executive stock
options until the last year of maturity that are at least 40% in-the-
money and zero otherwise.
Optimistic (70) (0/1) A dummy variable which equals one if a manager holds executive stock
options until the last year of maturity that are at least 70% in-the-
money and zero otherwise.
Optimistic (100) (0/1) A dummy variable which equals one if a manager holds executive stock
options until the last year of maturity that are at least 100% in-the-
money and zero otherwise.
Pre-Optimistic (0/1) A dummy variable which equals one in the time period before a manager
ever held an option until the final maturity year, which is at least 40%
in the money and zero otherwise.
Post-Optimistic (0/1) A dummy variable which equals one in the time period after a manager
ever held an option until the final maturity year, which is at least 40%
in the money and zero otherwise.
Holder67 (0/1) A dummy variable which equals one if a manager holds options five
years after the option grant that are at least 67% in-the-money. This
behavior has to be shown at least twice by the manager.
Voluntary Holder (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if
Stock Holdings
Salary >= Median(
Stock Holdings
Salary ) and zero otherwise, where:
Stock holdings is the value of company stock held by the CEO in $mil-
lion.
Salary is the CEO salary in $million.
Continued on next page
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continued from previous page
Variable Name Definition
Delta Overall delta of the option and stock portfolio held by the CEO divided
by total shares outstanding. The individual stock delta is one per
definition, the delta of an individual option is defined as e−dTN(Z).
Vega e−dTN ′(Z)ST 1/2 ∗ (0.01). In our regressions we use log(1 + vega) to
correct for the skewness of vega.
where:
Z =
[
ln (S/X) + T
(
r − d+ σ2/2
)]
/σT 1/2
N = cumulative probability function for the normal distribution
N
′ =normal density function.
S = price of the underlying stock
X = exercise price of the option
σ = expected stock-return volatility over the life of the option
r = natural logarithm of the risk-free rate
T = time to maturity of the option in years
d = natural logarithm of expected dividend yield over the life of the
option
Female (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if the CEO is female.
Ph.D. (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if the CEO holds a Ph.D. degree.
Age Age of the CEO in years at the time of the debt issue.
Tenure Time in days since the executive became CEO.
Borrower/Issuer characteristics:
Total Assets Firm’s total assets in $million.
Leverage Long-term debt divided by total assets.
Market-to-Book Market value of the firm divided by the book value of assets.
Tangibility Net property plant and equipment divided by total assets.
Interest Coverage Interest expenses divided by EBITDA.
Profitability EBITDA divided by total assets.
Continued on next page
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Variable Name Definition
Current Ratio Current assets divided by current liabilities.
Debt-to-EBITDA Total debt divided by EBITDA.
Not Rated (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if the borrower was not rated by
S&P at the time of the debt issue.
Investment Grade (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if the borrower was rated BBB-
or better by S&P at the time of the debt issue.
Rating Downgrade (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if the borrowing firm was down-
graded k years after a PSD issue and zero otherwise.
Loan characteristics:
Facility Amount Overall facility volume in $million.
Maturity Time to maturity in months.
Multiple Tranches (0/1) A dummy that equals one if the deal consists of more than one tranche
and zero otherwise.
Term Loan (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if the loan type is defined as "Term
Loan", "Term Loan A ... Term Loan H", or "Delay Draw Term Loan",
and zero otherwise.
Secured (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if the loan contains collateral
Post Turnover (0/1) An indicator variable which equals one if the loan was issued in the
three years following a CEO turnover.
PSD grid characteristics:
PSD (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if the loan contract includes a
performance pricing provision and zero otherwise.
PSD(Rating) (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if the loan contract includes a
performance pricing provision based on the issuer’s credit rating and
zero otherwise.
Continued on next page
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Variable Name Definition
PSD(Accounting) (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if the loan contract includes a
performance pricing provision based on an accounting ratio and zero
otherwise.
PSD(Increasing) (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if Si−SMin
SMax−SMin <
1
3 and zero oth-
erwise.
PSD(Mixed) (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if 13 >=
Si−SMin
SMax−SMin <
2
3 and zero
otherwise.
PSD(Decreasing) (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if Si−SMin
SMax−SMin >=
2
3 and zero
otherwise.
# Pricing Steps Number of pricing steps defined in the pricing grid.
Local Slope 0.5 ∗
(
Si+1−Si
Bondi+1−Bondi +
Si−Si−1
Bondi−Bondi−1
)
Local Slope ↑ Si−Si+1
Bondi−Bondi+1
Local Slope ↓ Si−1−Si
Bondi−1−Bondi
where:
i is the borrower’s long-term credit rating as of contract inception
i+ 1 is the borrower’s long-term credit rating as of contract inception
plus one notch (upgrade)
i− 1 is the borrower’s long-term credit rating as of contract inception
minus one notch (downgrade)
Si is the spread that the borrower has to pay given rating i
Si+1 is the spread that the borrower has to pay given rating i+ 1
Si−1 is the spread that the borrower has to pay given rating i− 1
SMin is the lowest spread defined in the pricing grid
SMax is the highest spread defined in the pricing grid
Bond refers to the market spread for the respective rating notch
Average Slope Calculated as Local Slope but over all rating notches defined in the
pricing grid.
Continued on next page
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Variable Name Definition
Average Slope ↑ Calculated as Local Slope ↑, but over all credit ratings above the firm’s
rating at the time of contract inception.
Average Slope ↓ Calculated as Local Slope ↓, but over all credit ratings below the firm’s
rating at the time of contract inception.
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